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Abstract 
Understanding details of human multimodal interaction can elucidate many aspects of the type of 
information processing machines must perform to interact with humans. This article gives an 
overview of recent findings from Linguistics regarding the organization of conversation in turns, 
adjacent pairs, (dis)preferred responses, (self)repairs, etc. Besides, we describe how multiple 
modalities of signs interfere with each other modifying meanings. Then, we propose an abstract 
algorithm that describes how a machine can implement a double-feedback system that can 
reproduces a human-like face-to-face interaction by processing various signs, such as verbal, 
prosodic, facial expressions, gestures, etc. Multimodal face-to-face interactions enrich the exchange 
of information between agents, mainly because these agents are active all the time by emitting and 
interpreting signs simultaneously. This article is not about an untested new computational model. 
Instead, it translates findings from Linguistics as guidelines for designs of multimodal man-machine 
interfaces. An algorithm is presented. Brought from Linguistics, it is a description pointing out how 
human face-to-face interactions work. The linguistic findings reported here are the first steps 
towards the integration of multimodal communication. Some developers involved on interface 
designs carry on working on isolated models for interpreting text, grammar, gestures and facial 
expressions, neglecting the interwoven between these signs. In contrast, for linguists working on the 
state-of-the-art multimodal integration, the interpretation of separated modalities leads to an 
incomplete interpretation, if not to a miscomprehension of information. The algorithm proposed 
herein intends to guide man-machine interface designers who want to integrate multimodal 
components on face-to-face interactions as close as possible to those performed between humans.  
 
1. Introduction 
Undoubtedly, the use of language is the most complex behavior known. Linguistics is a field of 
science that studies the attributes of languages, especially Natural Language(s) (NL), as human 
languages are known. NL serves as a tool that an agent (the emitter) uses to transmit multiples types 
of signs (sounds, gestures, facial expression, etc. – or multimodal signs), which are expected to be 
correctly interpreted by another agent (the recipient). In humans, we usually call “mind” such 
interpretative systems, thus, in this article we use the term mind instead of interpretative  systems. 
In this sense, the purpose of NL is to function as a tool that emitters use to trigger particular "states" 
in an interpretative mind. We can also say that emitters are motivated by "intentions" for 
communicating something, what lead them to use multiple resources for producing specific mental 
states in the recipient's mind. We use mind for both, humans and machines, presuming that 
someday machines will have an information processing system (a kind of mind) that generates and 
interprets messages using multimodal signs; what is to say we expect that machines will use NL in the 
same way humans do.  
Human multimodal communication has been the subject of studies in several areas, such as 
anthropology, psychology, linguistics, sociology, cognitive science, among others. This field of 
knowledge draws on sources derived from the studies as diverse as of the origin of multimodal 
communication (1), or gestures and representation in animals compared to human multimodality (2), 
(3), until more recently, with the development of multimodal interfaces for man-machine 
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interactions with special attention to robotics (4), (5), (6). Knowledge on the area have advanced in 
the last decades from theoretical evaluation (as in (7), (8)) to the developing multimodal interfaces 
for humanoid robots – see review in Turk (9). 
Our goal with this article is to describe progresses in Linguistics, especially in the field of multimodal 
face-to-face communication applied to human-machine interactions. We propose herein a kernel in 
the form of an algorithm that controls the multimodal fluidity in a face-to-face interaction, which 
uses verbal, prosodic, facial, gestural, and postural channels. This proposal results from an extensive 
work in which several videos of face-to-face interactions between humans were analyzed. The main 
goal of that work was to describe accurately how (and when) each multimodal sign interferes on 
fluency, on turn control, on repairs, as well as on the meaning of the messages. Within this algorithm 
we point out when certain “procedures” must be called to execute tasks such as interpreting 
linguistic meaning, semantic meaning, etc. We do not describe how to perform interpretation, which 
we understand are developed apart from this integrative algorithm. 
We describe a core algorithm that performs a high-level doubled-loop feedback. This structure is 
necessary for managing the exchange of multimodal messages between two agents in real-time face-
to-face interactions. Derived from human interaction observations, the approach presented here 
may serve as guideline for multimodal natural language processing developers in Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) . We have tried to find a way to explain what kind of computational tasks must be 
performed to implement the human form of multimodal interaction in a human-machine interface 
(HMI). We neither have invented a new “model” for an HMI software nor have implemented this 
algorithm. Instead, the algorithm presented forward is a “description”, or a “translation” of the 
findings in Linguistics concerning multimodal interaction. We used the algorithmic form for easy 
translation to other scientific communities. The algorithm serves to illustrate a "set of requirements" 
that intelligent HMI designers will have to deal with.  
Our research neither is based on data analysis of computational interactions nor brings results from a 
software interface implemented with the algorithm described below. Instead, what is described in 
this article results from hundreds of hours of face-to-face multimodal video analysis in the Linguistic 
field, a work that was already evaluated and published (10), (11). Our effort here is to translate that 
findings to another area of knowledge we suppose may be interested.. 
This article is organized as follows: in section II, the reader finds a brief description concerning 
theories and concepts that we borrow to compose this approach. In section III we describe materials 
and methods we have used in the analysis of human interactions. In section IV we show the results 
obtained in our observations and how we extracted the fundamentals to create the algorithm. In 
section V we describe the algorithm in the form of a pseudocode and analyze its operation. Section 
VI holds a critical analysis and discussions about some assumptions in our approach, as well as 
proposals for further investigation that can increase the knowledge about face-to-face multimodal 
interaction, especially research supported by neuroscience. In section VII we describe our 
conclusions. 
 
2. Theories 
Linguists try to comprehend and explain (the use of) language by various points of view, while 
scientists, engineers and the Artificial Intelligence (AI) community try to reproduce the use of natural 
languages in machines. Linguistics is composed of several theoretical fields, such as phonology, 
morphology, syntactics, semantics, among others related to social, historical and psychological 
aspects of language. A primary level of NL processing is to comprehend the content of a message, for 
instance, it would be to grasp an utterance such as "it's 7 o'clock". This level of interpretation is 
called "linguistic meaning". However, the one who emits this message may have a practical intention, 
which might be: "hurry up, we're late". Pragmatics is the area that studies this kind of linguistic 
interpretation, which is strongly dependent on context. Beyond that, there are higher levels of 
context-dependent interpretation. For instance, algorithms of "semantic interpretation" in AI usually 
assign a meaning to each word in an utterance, then words are combined within the sentences, and 
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then an overall meaning is extracted from that message. Semantic analysis is a complex area 
involving logic, which results in implications and assumptions. Beyond that, another area of linguistic 
interpretation is the "discourse analysis"; however, it is out of the scope of this article to go further 
on it. 
In this article, we borrowed knowledge and concepts that are studied within the areas of Pragmatics, 
Conversation Analysis (CA) (12), Gesture Studies (13), and Nonverbal Communication (14). We have 
also borrowed concepts of BDI agents’ model, widely known in AI community (15), (16), (17). BDI 
stands for agents with “beliefs, desires and intentions” which are embedded on their ontology. 
Concepts used in BDI models are well suited to our approach. In BDI model, an agent has desires, 
e.g.: “to cause a mental state in another agent”. To realize such desires, the agent creates plans of 
actions. Plans that the agent undertakes to perform become intentions, hence the agent starts 
carrying them out. The causation of “mental states” in other agent’s mind is a subject studied on 
Theory of Mind (ToM) (18), an area of Cognitive Science from whom we have also borrowed 
concepts. 
Concerning face-to-face interactions, a ‘common sense’ understanding is that there are well-defined 
roles when face-to-face interactions take place. For example, it is believed that actively, a speaker 
emits a message while a listener, passively, interprets the received signs. However, new findings 
show that this view is not correct, that both interactors are active during the time they interact, and 
that signs sent by both significantly affect the flow of communication, as well as the whole meaning 
of the message. For practical reasons, hereafter we will treat the "interactor/speaker" as the emitter 
and the "interactor/listener" as a recipient, although these roles are all the time executed by both, as 
shown later.   
We use in this article the term sign borrowed from Semiotics (19), (20). It is common in AI 
community to define language as a discrete, categorical, and symbolic system, which deals with 
symbols, instead of signs. Semiotics studies the construction of meaning, the process of semiosis, as 
well as meaning in communication. One of the types of signs defined in semiotics is the symbol, but 
there are others, such as index and icon.  We shall consider that, when planning and emitting a 
multimodal message, the agent uses signs that are not only symbols. For instance, when the agent’s 
finger points something or somewhere, or when the agent vocalizes ah, oh, hum etc. Thus, we 
understand that it is better to use the semiotic term sign for multimodal processes because sign is 
more comprehensive than the term symbol.  
Other theories could be applied to this approach. It is well known that affects play an important role 
when people interact face to face. Several works describe the importance of affects not only in 
interactions but also in decision making (21). In this sense, the Affect Control Theory (ACT - see(22), 
(23), (24), (25)) can perfectly be included in this framework. In addition, other models that deal with 
semantic interpretation and generalized references, such as Database Semantics (DBS (26,27), (28)) 
can also be incorporated to this framework. These and other models can be part of a deeper 
structure when implementing our algorithm.  Therefore, our approach deals with the explanation of 
how the operational flow of face-to-face interaction occurs. 
As said, distinct theories from a set of disciplines have been used in the composition of this work. The 
main theories are briefly discussed in this section in order to make their concepts accessible to a 
wider audience. 
 
2.1 The BDI model 
The belief–desire–intention (BDI) is a software model developed for programming intelligent agents 
(see (15), (16) (17)), characterized by including beliefs, desires and intentions in agent's model. The 
model uses these concepts to solve a problem in agent programming: to provide a mechanism for 
separating the activity of selecting a plan (from a library or an external planner application) from the 
execution of currently active plans. Consequently, BDI agents can balance the time spent on 
deliberating about plans (choosing what to do) and executing those plans (doing it). A third activity 
4 
 
foreseen in the style, the creation of plans (planning), is not within the scope of the model itself, and 
is left to the system designer and programmer. 
The BDI model appears in our framework because we suppose two agents (people or machines) 
interacting face-to-face. In this scenario, each agent must analyze more than one type of signs 
generated by the other. To do that, firstly, the agents must share knowledge (see Grounding - section 
2.5), which is related to the term beliefs in BDI agents. Moreover, in order to communicate an idea, 
an agent must carry out a plan of actions to generate a series of signs (sounds, gestures, prosody, 
etc.). The plan that the agent creates is equivalent to the term desire in the BDI model. Furthermore, 
to the extent the agent undertakes to execute such plan, this action equates to the intention in the 
BDI model. The algorithm we presented later uses BDI as inspiration, but it is not a direct 
implementation of BDI. 
 
2.2 Theory of Mind 
Theory of mind (often abbreviated ToM) is the ability of an “agent” to assign mental states— 
emotions, intentions, desires, knowledge, beliefs, etc.— to oneself, and to the others; as well as to 
understand that the others have emotions, beliefs, knowledge, desires, intentions, and perspectives 
that are different from one's own (18), (29), (30). Theory of Mind is crucial to everyday social 
interactions and is used when analyzing, judging, and inferring the other's behavior. ToM is a distinct 
subject and should not be confused with philosophy of mind. 
Let us link ToM with BDI model in the context of face-to-face interaction. It has been said that a BDI 
agent must devise a sequence of signs to communicate. However, agents may want more than just 
communicate. In fact, most of the time agents want to be understood by the others unequivocally. 
Saying differently, agents may not want simply to broadcast an alarm. By using NL, agents enchain 
series of signs to pass complex ideas they want to be correctly interpreted.  
It would be part of the agent's communication plan to predict the timing for emitting sounds, to 
choose prosody, gestures, expressions, among other signs. In order to choose which signs to place, 
and how to use them, the agent should have a notion of what is going to happen in the interpreter's 
mind. Moreover, an agent often has the intention of being interpreted in a particular way, for 
example, being ironic, severe, sarcastic, etc. Hence, the agent plans which signs to use that may 
cause that interpretation in the recipient’s mind. Therefore, an agent use ToM for creating a 
communication plan, which is then executed within the scheme of the BDI model. How the agent 
performs such plan within an interactive situation is the subject of the next theory.  
 
2.3 The Conversation Analysis Theory 
To our knowledge, Conversation Analysis (CA) (12) (31), an area of NL studies, is the theory that best 
explains the face-to-face speech interactions. CA is an approach to the study of social interaction, 
embracing speech conduct, in situations of everyday life. As its name implies, CA began with a focus 
on casual conversation, but its methods were subsequently adapted to embrace more task- and 
institution-centered interactions, such as those occurring in doctors' offices, courts, law 
enforcement, helplines, educational settings, and the mass media. Consequently, the term 
'conversation analysis' has become something of a misnomer, but it has continued as a term for a 
distinctive and successful approach to the analysis of social interactions. 
CA has some important concepts revealed by microlevel analysis that explain how people interact in 
a conversation, the most relevant to our proposal are detailed below. It is important to remember 
that CA theorists do not work with the prospect of intentions or mental states. In the eyes of these 
theorists it may seem incompatible that we are joining such different theories. In a way, we are 
crossing the boundaries of one field of research by incorporating knowledge from other disciplines in 
order to go a step further.  
CA was born inspired by ethnomethodology (32) which is the study of the methods people use to 
understand and produce the social order in which they live. Due to the ethnomethodological bias, it 
is not considered in CA the attribution of mental states to interacting agents. A CA researcher 
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considers only what is explicitly said / shown during a conversation. This is a viewpoint of a third 
person analyzing a video-recorded or audio-only interaction that should not guess the participant’s 
mental states. Although we used the concepts of CA, we cannot limit ourselves to just observing the 
interactors, since we must create agents that produces the conversation. In this sense, our point of 
view changes to an agent’s “mind”, which has to generate and interpret communicative action. This 
forces us to aggregate knowledge that seems incompatible to each other. In fact, we incorporate 
solid knowledge provided from CA and applied them in other area, preserving the main 
characteristics of what CA teaches us. 
 
2.3.1 Adjacent Pairs 
One of the concepts due to AC, left by H. Sacks, and later developed by G. Jefferson and E. Schegloff, 
concerns the fact that participants realize "paired" speeches (12), (33). In other words, what is said in 
an utterance by an interactor restrains the actions that will be produced by the other interactor’s 
next speech. In this sense, there are always shifts on the communicative actions, so called turns; 
thus, to make sense, the next turn for an interactor should be paired to the anterior utterances of 
the previous interactor. For instance, when one of the interactors makes an invitation to the other, 
the actions that would make sense on the next turn are "to accept", "to limit the acceptance", or "to 
refusal" such invitation. 
 
2.3.2 The Organization of Preference/Dispreference 
Closely linked to the notion of adjacent pairs is the organization of (dis)preferred responses (34). Let 
see once again the situation of an invitation. In general, when an interactor A invites an interactor B 
to do something, the interactor A expects that the interactor B accepts his invitation. When 
interactor B does positively answer the invitation, we say that B’s response is a preferred one, i.e. 
B’s response has fulfilled the expectation of interactor A  For CA, preferred actions are actions that 
are unnoticed, unmarked action, since it is the expected action; it conforms closely to the norm of a 
specific situation.   
The organization of preferred behavior is not only noticed in speech exchanges, it can be seen in any 
domain of social action. As Enfield (35) exemplifies: John is a plumber and by dressing in overalls 
while at work, he chooses the default, unmarked course of action. It is not only practical, but it is 
expected, the preferred action. He will not be held accountable or even commented on for doing it. 
However, if he works wearing a dress (dispreferred action), things could probably be different.  
From that understanding, we can say that the interactor’s response can be a preferred action 
whenever his responsive actions agree with the ongoing situation. Whenever his responsive action 
shows ambiguous alignment, we say that his response is neutral (e.g. whenever someone remains in 
silence when his interactor asks for an opinion about something; when he displays a blank face etc.). 
Notice that these behaviors can be interpreted as possible marks of disagreement, but since the 
interactor does not explicitly produced a speech showing his position about the topic, his behavior is 
considered a neutral one. Finally, when the interactor’s response shows disagreement with the 
ongoing situation, it is considered a dispreferred action, since it has not satisfied the other’s 
interactor expectation.        
In sum, according to CA perspective, disagreement is closely related to the notion of (dis)preferred 
responses. Preferred responses are those that are expected, being restricted by context or by 
cultural rules. For instance, if agent A greets agent B, it is expected that agent B greets in reply. The 
agent B’s response, considering that he greets in reply, is considered a preferred response. In case 
the agent B does not greet in reply, he could be taken as a rude person, i.e. his behavior could be 
interpreted as a dispreferred action for this specific situation. Following this understanding, the 
agent’s responses of disagreement during a political dispute, for instance, will be considered 
preferred answers since they will fulfill the expectation of the moment. On the contrary, if the agent 
agrees with his opponent, his response will be considered dispreferred for the situation.     
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2.3.3 Turn-taking Organization 
The turn-taking organization is a system that orients the social behavior people elicit in their context-
situated usage of NL. Whenever people are requesting, inviting, questioning, answering, agreeing, 
disagreeing, complaining, excusing, insulting and so on, they do it in turns constructed and 
distributed through the turn-taking system. The notion of adjacent pairs can only be productive if we 
accept the turn-taking organization, if we understand that conversation is only possible when 
interactors change their role as emitter and recipient all the time.  
According to Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (31), a seminal text about the organization of turn-taking 
system, a turn consists of vocal/verbal production. The turn can be composed of a single word or 
many sentences. However, this description of a turn is being questioned by researchers from Gesture 
Studies and Nonverbal Communication. These researchers claim that gestural actions can also be 
interpreted as turns. For instance, a request can be done using different practices, such as 
interrogative utterances (Could you pass me that knife?), imperative utterances (Pass me that 
knife), or declarative statement of relevance (I need a knife). For CA perspectives, only these 
practices of language use are considered turns.  Nevertheless, a gestural move of pointing to the 
knife can effectively become an action for requesting a knife when the interactor produces the 
responsive move of delivering the knife to the requester. In this case, some researchers (e.g. Enfield 
(35), Mondada, (36)) consider the gestural moves as turns as well.  
 
2.3.4 The transition relevance place (TRP)   
This notion was introduced in Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (31) and describes a projectable 
moment during the flow of a speech in which the recipient can potentially take the floor and become 
the next emitter or the present emitter may continue with another utterance. For instance, let us see 
the dialogue:  
A: How far is the next gas station? 
B: It is about fifty-five miles away.  
A: Thank you.   
In situations like that, when agent A is saying his interrogative sentence (how far is the next gas 
station?), agent B projects the possible completion of the sentence at the moment agent A utters 
[sta] from gas station, taking under consideration not only the content of the sentence and the 
common knowledge shared by both interactors but also the raising pitch of the interrogative 
utterance. This moment is considered the transition relevance place (TRP), the moment in which 
agent B can take the floor and reply to agent A. Similarly, agent A is ready to reply his thanks as soon 
as agent B utters [fi] from fifty-five, since the information requested is already given, concerning this 
specific situation. 
As Levinson (37) declares, empirical evidences have shown that it takes over 600ms (see also Levelt 
(38)) to a person to plan and execute the shortest turn, while on average the gaps between turns are 
around 200ms, depending on the language (see (39), (40)). This suggest that agent B must plan his 
turn before agent A’s turn is finished. It also implies that agent B’s turn must mostly be connected to 
agent A’s turn content, specially by the sequence organization: if agent A’s turn is a question, B’s 
turn is expectably an answer; if it is an invitation, an acceptance or a refusal is expected and so forth.  
 
2.3.5 Repairs 
Repair is a notion from CA that describes how interactors deal with troubles that can arise in 
speaking (production), hearing, and understanding (e.g. (33), (41), (42)). According to this 
perspective, the repair can be initiated by the interactor/emitter (self-initiated repair) or by the 
interactor/recipient (other-initiated repair) and can be done by the emitter or by the interactor, 
resulting in four possibilities for the repair system. Although CA does not accept bodily moves as an 
action that can trigger repairs, empirical evidences show that this kind of behavior is widely used by 
interactors. For instance, a recipient’s frown can indicate to the emitter that his interactor has not 
7 
 
listen or understand well his utterance production. In this case, some researchers will describe the 
recipient’s frown as an action of other-initiated repair (e.g. (43)).  
 
2.4 The Gestural Studies 
2.4.1 Nonverbal Communication Studies 
In this field, communication among people is investigated by the wordless perspective. Nonverbal 
Communication deals only with bodily actions without considering their relation to speech. Bodily 
actions are examined from two main points of view. In one perspective, they are considered to be 
indications of inner emotional states and processes (e.g. (44)). In this perspective, a smile is 
predominantly an indication of an individual’s positive emotions, such as joy and amusement, even 
though a smile can sometimes also index other emotions associated to negative feelings (e.g. (14), 
(45)). The other main perspective emphasizes the social dimension of bodily actions. They can be 
considered as communicative acts serving interpersonal functions. In this perspective, for instance, a 
smile signals an intention to affiliate, while a sad face signals a request for comfort (e.g. (46)). 
 
2.4.2 Gesture Studies 
Differently from Nonverbal Communication, Gesture Studies consider bodily movements as social 
and communicative resources, taking under consideration the relationship between bodily actions 
and speech. From this perspective, gestural behaviors can add, complete, substitute, negate, 
illustrate, emphasize, comment, among other things what is being uttered by the agent. Researchers 
from this area adopt the perspective of speech and gestural actions as a single, unified process, and a 
flexible interactional resource (e.g. (13), (47), (48), (49), (50), (51), (52), (53), (54)). Moreover, the 
recipients’ bodily actions are also closely connected with what is being uttered by his interactor, 
showing how participants need to construct and sustain mutual alignment in regard of the 
momentary unfolding of face-to-face interaction. 
 
2.5 Grounding or Common Knowledge 
In broad accordance with Clark and Brennan (55) by common ground, we mean the set of 
assumptions that the interaction partners share about the ongoing interaction. These assumptions 
may concern objects and actions as well as the interaction partner’s understanding of the situation 
and the communicative goals. In certain sense, common ground is also a subject dealt by other 
theories; such as Affect Control Theory (ACT) (22), (23); but with a different name. See articles (25) 
and (24) for an implementation of ACT using a Bayesian model that deals with common 
interpretation or identities representation.  
As said earlier, an agent not only must be able to use Theory of Mind but also must create a plan 
with a sequence of signs in order to communicate an idea. Thus, the base of signs and 
communication rules must be compatible with those used by the interacting agent. In other words, 
agents who communicate face-to-face must share a common knowledge as well as they must 
foresee what such signs may cause in the other’s agent mind. The concept of having common 
knowledge is called “grounding” in Linguistics.  
For instance, suppose an agent only speaks Hungarian language and another agent only speaks the 
Kikamba language. It may be impossible direct communication between them since they do not 
share the basics for a verbal conversation. There is always the resource of gesture communication, 
but gestures may also generate signs that do not have the same meaning for both. 
Misunderstandings are easy to rise in such situations. Some gestures, such as asking for food or 
water, may be easy to understand, because humans share at least some bodily gestures that are 
directly related to physical actions we carry out to satisfy basic needs.  
Let us suppose an agent A interacting with an agent B. The knowledge an agent holds about the 
other should grow as they interact in several situations. For example, A noted that agent B responds 
with a nervous smile when he hears a reprimand speech. A must realize throughout the progress of 
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interaction that this action of B is not a sarcastic reaction, but only the way this agent reacts when 
reprimanded. Now, suppose A noticed that an agent C always wrinkles his forehead when he hears a 
reprimand speech. A must realize during the interaction that reaction is not a threat, but only the 
way C reacts when reprimanded. Probably, not always these agents will react the same way, the 
reactions are context dependent.  
This means that agents must create and maintain knowledge bases for each agent they interact with. 
A stable common knowledge allows agents to predict roughly what certain signs (or sequence of 
signs) may cause in other’s agents mind. Thus, individualizing adaptive knowledge bases between 
agents may be important. It may help agents to avoid generating sequences of signs that will be 
mistakenly perceived, not understood, and not comprehended. 
 
2.6 Components of multimodal communication 
This is a summary of all the components that appear in a multimodal face-to-face communication. 
We will show the components as items, with a brief discussion of the modality and an example. It will 
not be possible to delve into the discussion of each modality or the intersection between modalities. 
Possibly with few exceptions, animals communicate a state of the world (or mental state) of the now, 
be it an imminent danger, an internal state like fear, anger, or even a warning of an action that is in 
execution. On the other hand, by using natural languages (NL) humans insert in the message 
temporal relations, description, of causal relations, as well as imaginative thoughts. NL is composed 
of segmental signs (information packets) that are recursively used (e.g. phonemes, letters, gestures, 
etc.). Because it is composed of recurrent signs, languages require a set of rules to organize what is 
expressed. One must separate and organize the subject, the verb, and the predicate. Firstly, natural 
languages require that speakers have a prior agreement on the meaning of the signs, and this 
requires that the speakers have a shared universe, that is, they know the same objects, affects, rules 
of language operation, etc. Moreover, NL also requires the possibility of temporal and spatial 
organization of signs (e.g. being able to speak of "where", "when", and sequences expressing "how"). 
In addition, NL requires the ability to express abstractions, thoughts, feelings and internal states, 
whether they are imagined or real. Finally, the NL requires a certain degree of self-awareness, that is, 
the agent must be aware that he is one of the participating elements of the interaction. 
We use several distinct channels to create signs that transmit messages in NL. We can classify the 
modalities as "oral", "verbal", and "gestural". 
 
2.6.1 Oral (or vocal) channel (or modality)  
In the oral channel we use: 
a) Sounds in the form of phonemes, interjections, markers, etc.; 
b) Volume of sound (the intensity of sound generated); 
c) Rhythm (pitch, or tempo, whether accelerated or slow); 
d) Intonational curve (if ascending is a question, if descending is exclamation, or being stable); 
e) Tonality (acute or severe - for example, the louder an emitter speaks the more shows that he is 
irritated or altered); 
f) Sociocultural characteristics (such as gender, age, regionalism, educational level, accent, etc.); 
g) Qualities of the voice (if you are tired, excited, sad, nervous etc.) 
The set of some of these components forms also is called prosody or paralanguage. 
 
2.6.2 Verbal channel (or modality)  
In verbal mode we use: 
a) Phoneme (minimum units of meaning, used to create more complex signs such as words, e.g.: P, B, 
U, etc. (e.g. English has 44 phonemes); 
b) Morphology (joins the phonemes to form a more complex unit – e.g. a word). At this level we 
define what is prefix, infix, suffix, radicals, among others; 
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c) Syntax (set of rules of use and grammatical description of the language). Syntax rules the order of 
words for meaning determination. Here we define the role of words in sentences: who does the 
action (subject), what action is / was / will be made (verb), in addition to complements such as 
objects, adverbs, adjectives, etc. (The canon for English is SVO subject-verb-object); 
d) Semantics (how the sentence is / should be interpreted by the recipient). 
 
2.6.3 Gestural channel (or modality)  
Here we consider the bodily actions that are visible and have communicative meaning, i.e., we are 
excluding the physiological bodily actions that do not contribute to the ongoing communicative 
purpose. For instance, if an agent blinks because there was a sudden change in light intensity, and 
such action do not contribute to the progress of the interaction, we consider it is only a physiological 
reaction of the agent’s body. We will separate the gestural mode in different classes of bodily actions 
derived from distinct parts of the body, which are face, limbs, and body as a whole. To generate the 
gestural mode, we use: 
a) facial expressions and facial actions – facial expressions communicate our inner state in the means 
of basic emotions (e.g. fear, joy, sadness, surprise, anger, contempt and disgust). In addition to these, 
several facial actions (movement of eyebrows, nose, jaw and lips) are performed by interactors 
during conversational interaction in order to communicate something to others; 
b) Eye gaze – in a broad sense, the eye gaze is used to show a shared attention. For instance, when a 
person looks to his interactor, he is demonstrating that his attention is on the other person. In the 
sequence, when he turns his looks to an object, he is indicating to his interactor that both should 
share the attention towards that object;   
c) Signature actions (manual gesture) - Hands are frequently used in communication and have a 
strong impact on what we communicate. Fingers point things, hands make gestures of protection, 
gestures that show nervousness, gestures that can complete an idea that is being uttered among 
other; 
d) Body actions (body postures) - Also involved in human communication are body postures, head 
movements, trunk and shoulder movements, legs and feet movements, as well as distancing 
between the interlocutors. 
It should be noted here that sign languages (SL) are natural languages that use the three modalities 
described above, using only image signs, not vocalized signs. In other words, sign languages do not 
use auditory resources, but construct complex meaning, using oral, verbal, and gestural channels 
throughout visible body resources. For example, in sign language a signal with a brow may represent 
a question; a duplicated sign (repeated sign in sequence) can act as an enhancer, a role like prosody; 
the intensity at which a manual gesture is performed may represent a feeling of anger. These are 
important information for those who intend to create interfaces for natural language communication 
with machines using SL.  
 
3. Materials and methods 
We have studied face-to-face conversations taking into account multimodal aspects of the 
interactions. We have video-recorded and (frame by frame) analyzed several interactions observing 
the theoretical aspects described in the previous section (11), (10). The way we have conducted our 
research is described below. 
 
3.1 Participants  
Twenty-one participants from different cities in Brazil took part in this research. All participants were 
native Brazilian-Portuguese speakers and have different gender, age, educational and professional 
background. Participants were videotaped in face-to-face conversation pairs. All of them signed the 
Consent Form before being recorded. 
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3.2 Materials and procedures   
Thirty video recorded dialogues were analyzed for this research. Most of the dialogues were 
produced while the participants were seated facing each-other at a comfortable conversational 
distance. The participants talked for approximately 30 min. In some recorded dialogues, the 
participants choose their own topic of conversation; in others, the participants were told to talk 
about a specific subject or to perform a joint task. Each dyad was recorded with five cameras: two for 
participants’ close-ups, two for participants’ frontal medium shots, and one for both participants’ 
lateral wide-angle shot.   
 
3.3 Data analysis 
We have used the software ELAN (https://tla.mpi.nl/tools/tla-tools/elan/) to transcribe the speech 
and to code the bodily action from the participants. We have transcribed the participants’ speech 
based on the notion of intonational unit (IU), which corresponds to a verbal content plus prosody 
(see (56), (57)), and some procedures described by Jefferson (58).  Oriented by controlled 
vocabularies proposed by LLIC (Language, Interaction and Cognition Laboratory – USP– Brazil), 
schemes for head movement, facial actions (eyebrow, eyelid, and mouth), shoulder movement, body 
torque and manual gesture were continuously coded for both participants of the dialogue.   
 
4. Results 
By promoting a qualitative analysis on the video streams at a micro level, five video shots precisely 
synchronized for each conversation, we observe some regularities that are firstly noticed in 
situations of answers of disagreement (in terms of CA concepts).  
 
4.1 The double-loop feedback 
After thorough analysis of various human interactions, we can conclude that a face-to-face 
interaction between two agents will be complete only when a double feedback loop is established. 
The emitter is uttering not only the sentences for the recipient, but also is producing a series of 
multimodal signs, either by voice intonation, by facial expressions, by body posture, by manual 
gestures, etc. On the other hand, the recipient is also emitting speech/vocal signals, as well as a 
series of signs through facial expressions, gestures, posture, etc. Thus, we can certainly say that both 
are simultaneously emitters and recipients of signs during an interaction. Moreover, we can say that 
both are interpreters of the various multimodal signs emitted by the agent with whom they are 
interacting. Descriptions from a linguistic point of view are more detailed in (10).  
 
4.2 Timing and Repair Situations 
Paying attention to contexts of disagreement, we observe how recipient’s bodily action, and/or his 
vocal disagreement are firstly displayed during the emitter’s turn. We notice that this kind of 
recipient’s behavior promotes an opportunity for emitter to rephrase his speech attempting to 
obtain the preferred response. We also notice that the recipient’s disagreement display, being this 
display by vocal and/or gestural modalities, is produced at a specific moment (the moment of a 
possible turn competition - TRP) comprised into the emitter’s utterance that has elicited the 
recipient’s disagreement.  
Observing cases of disagreement situations (dispreferred answers), based on CA perspective (see 
topic 2.3.2) and of formulation of repairs (see topic 2.3.5), we can conclude that the time in which 
recipient’s feedback occurs is too important to be ignored. When the recipient’s feedback associated 
to negative behavior (e.g. a frown) is produced around the TRP of the emitter’s utterance, there is a 
tendency for the emitter to perform a 'fix' (a repair) or a ‘shift’ on his message. This is best 
understood by the following dialogue (Table 1). Let us consider an example about how recipient’s 
bodily action seems to interfere in the production of the emitter’s speech. This fragment of face-to-
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face interaction shows two women who have just met and who were asked to perform the task of 
proposing a decoration for a living room.  
 
Table 1: Transcription of an excerpt from an interaction between two participants 
  Brazilian-Portuguese English 
1 A:  bom aqui a gen- gen- a gente tem um hall:: né? well, here it it it’s a hall::, isn’t it? 
2 B: tá hã yeah, hã 
3  de entrada, [né]? front hall, [isn’t it]?   
4 A:                       [é  ]                    [yes     ] 
5  aparentemente seemingly 
6  um hall e us- a sala a hall and a- the living room 
7 B: [t á ] [yea h           ] 
8 A: [n é]? [aren’t they]? 
9 B: acho que a gente precisa ter um cabide    I think we should have a hanger 
10  (.) (.) 
11 A: cabide? hanger? 
12 B: sabe  [pra::      ] you know? [to::     ]          
13 A:            [°cabid-°]?                     [ °rac- °]? 
14 B: por casaco hang coats 
15 A: ah:: um cabideiro ahn:: a rack 
16  [tá ] [yeah] 
17 B: [éh], sim [yeah] yes 
18 A: tá yeah 
19  (.) (.) 
20 B: mas  po[de  ser     ] but it [ can  be   ] 
21 A:               [cabideiro]           [hat stand] 
22 B: pode ser na parede it can be on the wall 
23  não precisa ser no chão it doesn’t need to be those that stand 
24  porque ocupa menos espaço do chão because it can spare floor space 
25 A: tá:: éh yeah:: yeah 
26  pratelei::ras:::? shel::ves::? 
27  
cabi[deiros ou prateleiras e gavetei]ros=   =com- ra[ck   or   shelves   and   draw]ers= 
=with- 
28 B:         [ai::, nossa  prateleira                 ] [wow,  yes  shelf                        ] 
 
At the beginning they try to agree about the type of room they might decorate (lines 1-8). Then, B 
proposes a hanger (line 9). A pause (line 10) occurs during which A produces some facial actions and 
questions about the word used by B (line 10), showing that a repair is needed. B provides the repair 
(lines 12 and 14), explaining what she meant by the word. During her verbal production, she 
pretends to be hanging a coat at a hook. B starts her bodily actions as soon as she finishes producing 
you know? (line 12). Interactor A starts proposing an understand (rac- -line 13) but holds herself until 
B finishes her repair. Then A shows her understanding of B’s proposition (ahn::: a rack – line 15). B 
initiates a self-repair, telling A that the rack can be the type of a hanger on the wall (lines 20 and 22-
23). Taking only the verbal production, we understand that B’s produces a self-repair. However, the 
video shows that during the agreement between them (lines 16-19), A looks at the wall and points to 
it. As soon as she did that, B tries to rephrase her proposal, producing the apparently self-repair. She 
initiates her utterance with but (line 20), demonstrating that she probably had another type of 
hanger on her mind (a hat stand) and not a hanger on the wall, but accepts A’s understanding/idea 
about this piece of furniture. On the other hand, A also produces a self-repair, changing her initial 
understanding (a rack – line 15) to a comprehension about what B wants as a hanger (hat stand – 
line 21). All the adjustments of the emitters have been fired by the recipients’ bodily action during 
the emitter’s turn. One can argue that it is just a coincidence; however, in our analysis we note that 
this type of interactors’ behavior is recurrent. The change of emitters’ behavior shows that 
interactors search for preferred replies (agreement displays) all the time during the interaction. In 
this example, both interactors were trying to search the preferred reply for their plans: A seems to 
have in mind another type of decoration for the front hall; nevertheless, she tries to understand B’s 
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proposal and adjusts her plan (shelves with drawers on the wall - line 27) until B accepts her proposal 
(line 28). In her turn, B seems to have a plan of a hat stand, tries to adjust her plan to a hanger on the 
wall, and, finally gives it up to accept A’s proposal of a shelf.        
Taking this kind of regularities as parameters, we have investigated if recipient also displays the same 
behavior on contexts of agreement (preferred answers). We have observed the same regularities. 
Recipients also produce bodily actions and/or vocal agreement displays at the moment of a possible 
turn completion. From such observations, we have inferred a general practice and proposed the 
algorithm for face-to-face interaction. 
 
4.3 Gesture and Repairs 
Definitely, facial expressions and gestures interfere with the execution of a communication plan. Let 
us consider that an agent created a plan and committed to the execution of that plan; that is, the 
agent’s intention is to communicate something through a sequence of sentences, intonations, 
gestures and postures. According to the above postulate, as soon as a double feedback loop is 
established, to the extent that one agent is issuing an utterance it is also evaluating the reactions of 
the other agent. Without going into too many examples, we all have experienced to talk to someone 
who shows no interest in what we are saying. How do we perceive that? We also have seen someone 
to make a facial expression clearly showing not to like something we have just said. Or someone that 
has interrupted our speech by a manual gesture, or even turned his head and shown interested on 
something happening nearby. In any of these situations, the emitter may repair using one or more 
signs to achieve the goal of his communicational act: to create a mental state in the recipient that 
clearly demonstrates that the message has been understood. 
Note that this has nothing to do with the recipient "to agree" with or "to refuse" the idea contained 
in the message (see discussion in section 6.3). We are only pointing to the fact that the emitter 
repairs its communication plan with the sole objective of sending the message clearly and most of 
time completely. In sum, we mean that the agent repairs a communication plan with the intention of 
being fully and well understood. 
 
5. Algorithm  
In order to give us an intuition, let us firstly exemplify how the face-to-face algorithm occurs. 
Consider that a human being (agent H) is talking to a machine (agent M), let's consider it a humanoid 
robot capable of performing human-like gestures. The robot first presents itself: “Hello, I am the 
agent M”. Following the theory of Conversation Analysis (CA), an adjacent pair must occur at this 
point; e.g., to an initial presentation, H should preferably respond with a greeting: “Nice to meet you, 
I'm H”; “Hi, I’m H”; “I’m H”; or any other form of greeting. 
Now, suppose that M must continue the conversation. According to CA theory, M will take the turn, 
that is, it will be M's turn to execute a whole communication sequence that we call communicational 
action. In this sense, communicational action refers to all verbal and gestural content that will be 
communicated within one turn. 
Naturally, M must mentally devise a “plan” concerning which phrase, signs, emphasis, intonation, 
gestures, facial expressions, etc. will be carried out during the next communicational action. In such 
plan, M divides the full communicational action into Intonational Units (IU). According to CA theory, 
IU are the speech flow that occurs with a single prosodic contour. Distinctly, we consider IU 
associated to bodily actions (facial expressions, head movements, manual gestures, posture, etc.), so 
we use the term "Communicational Unit" (Cu) for each segment.  
In summary, M must quickly draw a plan on what and how to perform the next communicational 
action; then it must divide such plan into segments. Each segment (or unities) contains chunks of 
verbal communication and prosody associated to gestures and visible bodily actions, which will all be 
performed together. Each plan will transmit only one utterance, so to compose an idea or a speech 
with more than one utterance the agent must compose as many communicational action as the idea 
requires. Sometimes an idea requires multiples sentences within the same turn. 
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People have in common sense that, when one agent takes the turn, it becomes the "speaker" and 
the other becomes the "listener." Thus, in the case proposed above, M would be the emitter (active) 
while H would be the recipient (passive) during the period in which M has the turn and tries to 
perform its communicational action. However, as described in section 4.1, that is not what we have 
observed in our data. Throughout the time M performs its communicational action two feedback 
loops are established in the face-to-face interaction. Firstly, agent H hears and perceives the visible 
bodily actions performed by M. During this time, H interprets both, the verbal communication (what 
is said) associated to the prosody, as well as all kinds of gestural signs that M can perform (facial 
actions, head movements, hand gestures and body posture). Moreover, during the time H interprets 
M's communicational action, H generates feedback, which occurs not only in the form of vocal 
markers (such as hum, ah, oh, uh ...) or verbal content (such as well, what?) but also in the form of 
visible bodily actions (facial expressions, facial actions, hand gestures, head movement, etc.). 
Therefore, the "recipient" is an active agent, not a passive one. The second feedback loop is formed 
because upon perceiving such signals, M itself repairs its initial communication plane. Note that H 
can explicitly perform a repair on something expressed by M, but because M is interpreting H's 
feedback, M can perform self-repair on its initial plane.   
It should be noticed that the process of conversation and face-to-face interaction is a dynamic 
system in which communication is hardly a simple and direct transmission of information. The 
process is not like a text-to-speech program reading an unchangeable ready-made phrase from a 
text. During face-to-face interaction, one agent can interrupt the other and perform a turn taking, for 
instance. Moreover, one may complement or disagree with the communicational action that the 
other interactor is performing even before the agent finishing his turn.  
Let us consider that M was able to perform all its communicational action, so by the adjacent pair 
formed, H should continue with a compatible communicational action, taking the turn of the 
conversation. This implies H mentally should also create his communication action plan, should 
divide it into Cus, and then should perform each segment expressing himself verbally, with prosody, 
including gestures. For sure, H would expect that the machine (M) can interpret the signs he/she is 
emitting, as well as would expect that they both have the same shared knowledge and have 
contextualized the interaction. 
 
5.1 Contextualization 
After an interactive experience, agents should memorize the result, in the same sense humans 
memorized every interaction they perform. We filter most of the signs in our interactions, perhaps 
because we classify our interactors in stereotypes: “Tom makes excessive gestures while speaking”; 
“David is harsh in his responses”; “Anna has a nervous smile when she lies”. We may not know to 
explain how we do it, but we take all this information into account when we talk to other person. 
Such filters make our interpersonal communication more efficient. Because we use ToM, we include 
in our communication plan preferable signs for each one of our interactors. As a consequence, we 
also interpret certain signs emitted by the others as traces of their personalities – not a raw element.  
In this sense, we must observe that common knowledge is not just about sharing cultural or 
contextual knowledge. We create individual databases that help us to perform better personal 
communication; while we share more general contextual information that relates to a certain 
community in specific situations, as well as cultural information that aggregates us into a larger 
communities, most of the time sharing the same language, beliefs, habits, etc.  
The Affect Control Theory (ACT) is a psychological social theory of interaction, which proposes that 
the perceptions, actions, and emotional experiences of human beings are governed by the need to 
minimize deviations between transient impressions and culturally established social feelings that 
comes from interactive situations. Such deviations can be quantified, so, this theory has great appeal 
for application in AI (22). ACT is a theory that explains the main idea described above. In few words: 
we create social dictionaries of meanings, affects and sentiments based on our interactions. The role 
one interactor plays in certain situation depends on an institutional context. For instance, your boss 
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or your teacher must play a hierarchical role in the office/classroom but he may play distinct role 
when playing soccer with his employees/students. These situations result quite different forms of 
interaction. Following the above reasoning, for each interaction, interactors not only contribute in 
constructing a common social dictionary of meanings, actions, sentiments, but also create a dataset 
of how a specific interactor normally responds, acts, reacts, interprets and reveals sentiments, etc. 
ACT is a good theory for creating subsystems for dealing with these components on interactions; 
however it is out of the scope of this article to go further on this subject (see (25)).  
Considering what has been explained above, in order to have a face-to-face communication 
experience more alike to that of humans, we believe that machines also need to have a mechanism 
not only to interpret speech combined to bodily actions, but also to memorize individual 
interactions, which may generate an individualized common grounding knowledge. 
Considering this, a context is a situation in which agents observe: (a) the institutional situation in 
which the interactors are immerse, (b) their roles and hierarchical positions in the interaction, (c) the 
appropriate cultural dictionary to be used in such situation, (d) the individual database about the 
other interactor. Thus, agents should restore how the other interactor acts, his/her typical gestures, 
intonations, lexical preferences, as well as several other details that form the other interactor’s 
personality. The overcome of the cultural aspects over the agent's personality is strongly governed 
by the institutional situation. A formal or informal interaction is pre-established at the beginning of 
the interaction, as well as the role the interactors play. 
 
5.2 The Formal Algorithm 
The algorithm is formalized in an abstract way, so it will be possible to implement it partially or with 
more details than those described here. For simplicity, let us call ξ the emitter agent and ℜ the 
recipient agent. These roles will change frequently every time a turn change occurs. Still for 
simplicity, let us call mind a system composed by a set of complex modules that process the 
information the agents are receiving or emitting. Let us describe this system as modular as possible, 
so we can separate the computational tasks. Initially, the agents are in a context and must share 
some knowledge. This means that as soon as the agents are placed face-to-face,  computational 
modules retrieve data and update the context. We may represent the data in the interactor’s minds 
as: 
Ϛ𝜉 = { Α𝑠 , Β𝑠, } 
Ϛℜ = { Α𝑠 , Β𝑠, } 
K𝜉 = { Α𝑠, Β𝑠, } 
Kℜ = { Α𝑠 , Β𝑠, } 
where Ϛξ is a tuple with information about the initial context for the agent ξ, and Ϛℜ is a similar tuple 
for the agent ℜ. Similarly, Kξ is a tuple with the shared knowledge the agent ξ has concerning the 
agent ℜ, and Kℜ is a similar tuple with the knowledge that the agent ℜ shares with respect to the 
agent ξ.  Note that Ϛξ and Kξ are processed on the mind of the agent ξ, and they are not equal to Ϛℜ 
and Kℜ, which are processed on the mind of the agent ℜ. Note also that it does not matter whether ξ 
and ℜ have ever met each other. The tuples Kξ and Kℜ are updated during (and after) the interaction 
to include or to delete data concerning the interactor. Thus, the agents can start an interaction only 
with the minimum grounding knowledge: the capability of exchange information using a shared 
language, as well as the cultural meaning of some gestures within that language. 
 
 5.2.1 The Agent’s Intention 
Consider that an agent playing ξ starts the interaction, so, it takes the first turn. Remember that, 
before starting, ξ must create a communication plan that contains what it intends to communicate as 
well as how it intends to do that. The plan is composed by a sequence of verbal, intonational, facial, 
gestural signs. Let us write the plan formally as: 
𝒫𝑡𝑥
𝜉
= {{𝒞𝑢1, 𝔉1 }, {𝒞𝑢2, 𝔉2 }, {𝒞𝑢3, 𝔉3 }, … , {𝒞𝑢𝑧, 𝔉𝑧}} 
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where 𝒫𝑡0
𝜉
is a tuple representing the communication plan the agent ξ create for a turn tx. Such tuple 
is a set of z Communicational Unities (𝒞𝑢1 … 𝒞𝑢𝑧). As said, Cu is a cell in which ξ associate 
phonemes/words with intonation and multimodal signs. Thus, a Cu is a chunk of information the 
emitter performs expecting that the recipient interprets it as a meaningful unity. We consider that ξ 
must compromise itself with the execution of each plan 𝒫; hence, ξ has intentions of fully executing 
all communication plans. 
Human interactors take feedbacks into account to guarantee that the communication is correctly 
interpreted; thus, agents should associate each Cu to certain stereotyped feedbacks (𝔉1 … 𝔉z). 
Hence, during its turn ξ execute each Cuk expecting certain sound or visual feedbacks 𝔉k. Each 
communicational unity is a tuple composed by several sequential elements, which we separate here 
into six main classes: 
𝐶𝑢𝑘 = {𝕧𝑘 , 𝕡𝑘 , 𝕖𝑘 , 𝕘𝑘 , 𝕙𝑘, 𝕓𝑘} 
where Cuk is the tuple ξ have planned or executed during the turn “tx” at the sub-unity k. As part of a 
communication plan, Cuk is compound by: 𝕧k, the verbal components made of phonemes, words, 
sentences grammatically suitable for the chosen language, etc. The component 𝕡k is the prosody 
elements to be used during the verbalization, 𝕖k is the facial expression the agent intends to do, 𝕘k is 
the gestures the agent intend to perform with its hands and its superior members, 𝕙k represents the 
head and shoulders movements, and 𝕓k is the body posture the agent intend to apply. 
Each expected feedback unity is a tuple that may be composed by several sequential components, 
which we separate here into six main classes: 
𝔉𝑘 = {𝓿𝑘, 𝓹𝑘 , 𝓮𝑘 , 𝓰𝑘 , 𝓱𝑘 , 𝓫𝑘, } 
where 𝔉k is the tuple representing a set of feedback that ξ may expect during the turn “tx” at the sub-
unity k. 𝔉k is part of an intentional plan, thus, 𝓿k is the vocal and/or verbal feedback expected during 
this sub-unity, also called markers, which include sounds such as “hum, ok, oh, ah”, among others 
and/or words or expressions such “well, ok, no, yes, yeah, that’s it”, among other. The component 
𝓹k is related to the prosody associated to markers, for instance, a question marker such as “ahn?”. 
The 𝓮k represents facial expressions the agent may expect to interpret during the current Cuk, as well 
as the feedbacks 𝓰k, 𝓱k, and 𝓫k, which are related to gestural, head movements, and bodily postures 
respectively.  
It is important to note that expected feedbacks are also context dependent, and agents must 
consider different types of feedback they may receive from distinct interactors. But why should an 
agent include in its communication plan all kinds of interactors’ feedback? Because we use 
communication protocols that we follow strictly for a variety of reasons: to communicate more 
efficiently, to be polite, to know if we have been correctly interpreted, among other reasons. Then, 
we use several channels to make sure that each fragment we want to communicate is correctly 
interpreted. If we detect any discrepancy, we make repairs to our plan. For this reason, ξ expects 
feedback throughout the time. As ξ executes the communication plan, it makes repairs to the 
communicational units and, sometimes, to the whole communication plan. Such reformulation can 
be trigged by the emitter ξ itself or by the agent ℜ’s feedback (see section 2.3.5).   
So far, we considered that ξ has created a plan 𝒫𝑡0
𝜉
 for the turn t0, and it is going to execute it step-
by-step.  During the time in which ξ executes its turn, the agent ℜ not only interprets all signs 
emitted by ξ but also creates his own communication plan in real time to answer ξ next. Moreover, ℜ 
also provides vocal/verbal and gestural feedbacks to ensure the interaction fluency. The agent’s ℜ 
plan has the same format as the emitter's plan: 
𝒫𝑡+1
ℜ = {{𝒞𝑢1, 𝔉1 }, {𝒞𝑢2, 𝔉2 }, {𝒞𝑢3, 𝔉3 }, … , {𝒞𝑢𝑧, 𝔉𝑧}} 
Suppose now that the agent ξ starts executing the plan 𝒫𝑡0
𝜉
 for the first turn “t0”. As said, the agent 
ought to vocalize sounds, to apply correct prosody to them, to perform facial expressions, gestures, 
head movements, and body posture. Concurrently, the ξ’s input modules must process feedbacks 
and interpret sounds, facial expressions, gestures, head movements, and body posture coming from 
the other interactor. Fortunately, the same algorithm can be used for the two roles. To change from 
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one state to another is only a matter of taking the turn. In the next section we describe a general 
pseudocode in format of an algorithm showing how an agent may play both roles. 
Note that we use tuples in the above reasoning to describe possible states of internal variables in the 
agent's mind. We do not prescribe a format for representing data or states of the world, neither a 
theory to be applied for processing such information nor which technology can better perform such 
processing. We suggested that ACT can be a theory to explain contexts and hierarchical interactions, 
but other theories can be used. Likewise, each module in the algorithm can use different data type, 
models or tools; for instance, Bayesian networks, Markov chains, artificial neural networks, fuzzy 
logic, deep learning, or hybrid technologies. 
 
5.2.2 The Algorithm Kernel 
This algorithm describes the top level of an intricate information processing system. Every module 
referred next is a complex computational system by itself. For example, we referred to a facial 
expression module simply by triggering a module, however, image recognition itself is a quite 
complex task of computer vision. Another example is a module that outputs sound with prosody, 
which would be implemented as a text-to-speech engine with intonation and other vocal attributes, 
which is not perfectly developed till the current days. In the pseudocode for the algorithm kernel, 
consider that not necessarily the lines are executed in sequence as a normal computer program. 
Instead, these lines describe more a loop that triggers several tasks for parallel execution.  
 
In this pseudocode, consider: a=”agree”; d=”disagree”; t=”turn”; c=”change_turn” 
                              ˅=or logical; ˄=and logical 
 
01 while (interacting)                    // while the agents are interacting 
02   𝛷 = context[];                       // phi holds parameters of the context 
03   if (my.turn==1)                      // ** my turn? (play the emitter) 
04     z=length(𝒫(ξ,t));                  // z tracks the size of the plan   
05     for k=1 to z                       // for all items of the communication plan 
06       out_Verbal(𝕧[ξ,k,𝛷], 𝕡[ξ,k,𝛷]); // out planned (ξ,k) verbal + prosody 
07       out_FacialExpression(𝕖[ξ,k,𝛷]);  // out planned (ξ,k)facial expressions 
08       out_Gesture(𝕘[ξ,k,𝛷]);           // out planned (ξ,k)manual gesture 
09       out_HeadMove(𝕙[ξ,k,𝛷]);         // out planned (ξ,k)head,shoulders movs 
10       out_BodyPosture(𝕓[ξ,k,𝛷]);      // out planned (ξ,k)body posture 
//get feedbacks, interpret them, then change or not the planned Cu(k) 
11       𝓿k = in_Verbal(Ρ);              // listen to verbal feedback 
12       𝓿’k = lang_meaning(k,𝛷,𝓿’k);    // interpret them 
13       𝓹k = in_Prosody(Ρ);             // listen to prosody feedback 
14       𝓹’k = prosody_meaning(k,𝛷,𝓹’k); // interpret them 
15       𝓮k = in_Facial(Ρ);               // get facial images 
16       𝓮’k = facial_meaning(k,𝛷,𝓮’k);   // interpret as facial expressions 
17       𝓰k = in_Gesture(Ρ);             // get manual gesture images 
18       𝓰’k = gesture_meaning(k,𝛷,𝓰’k); // interpret them as gestured signs 
19       𝓱k = in_HeadMovements(Ρ);       // get head and shoulders images 
20       𝓱’k = headMov_meaning(k,𝛷,𝓱’k); // interpret them as gestured signs 
21       𝓫k = in_BodyPosture(Ρ);         // get body images 
22       𝓫’k = posture_meaning(k,𝛷,𝓫’k); // interpret them as body postures 
23       {𝓿”k,𝓹”k,𝓮”k,𝓰”k,𝓱”k,𝓫”k}=semantics(𝓿’k,𝓹’k,𝓮’k,𝓰’k,𝓱’k,𝓫’k,αk-1,πk-1,𝛷); 
24       αk = adjacent_pair({𝓿”k,𝓹”k,𝓮”k,𝓰”k,𝓱”k,𝓫”k });      //is fdbk an AP? 
25       πk = pref_dispreference({𝓿”k,𝓹”k,𝓮”k,𝓰”k,𝓱”k,𝓫”k }); //is fdbk P/D? 
//if some feedback is interpreted as a disagreement: 
26       if (𝓿”k==d ˅ 𝓹”k==d ˅ 𝓮”k==d ˅ 𝓰”k==d ˅ 𝓱”k==d ˅ 𝓫”k==d ˅ αk==d ˅ πk==d)  
27         call_my.Repair(k,𝛷);         // self-repair the plan  
28         z=length(𝒫(ξ));              // change z if the plan was resized 
//on the other hand, if all feedback indicate agreement:  
29       else if (𝓿”k==a ˄ 𝓹”k==a ˄ 𝓮”k==a ˄ 𝓰”k==a ˄ 𝓱”k==a ˄ 𝓫”k==a ˄ αk==a ˄ πk==a) 
30         continue;                    // just continue the plan 
//but if no feedback is given by the interactor           
31       else 
32         call_emphasize(𝕧,𝕡,𝕖,𝕘,𝕙,𝕓,k,𝛷); // emphasize some signals 
33         z=length(𝒫(ξ));              // it may have resized the plan 
//these codes control which piece of the plan are executed  
34       if (k<=z)                      // if the index k <= size of the plan 
35         k = K+1;                     // just increment the index 
36       else (k>z)                     // after reaching the end of the plan 
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37         out_ChangeTurn();            // output a sign showing “turn changing” 
38         my.turn==0;                  // change its own status to interpreter 
// end of emitter loop, now the pseudocode for the recipient/interpreter 
39   else                               // ** not my.turn? (play the recipient) 
40     while (my.turn==0)               // while playing the interpreter… 
41       k = 0;                         // start Cu(k) counter 
42       𝓿k = in_Verbal(ξ);             // listen to verbal feedback 
43       𝓿’k = lang_meaning(k,𝛷,𝓿’k);   // interpret them 
44       𝓹k = in_Prosody(ξ);            // listen to prosodic feedback 
45       𝓹’k = prosody_meaning(k,𝛷,𝓹’k);// interpret them 
46       𝓮k = in_Facial(ξ);              // get facial images 
47       𝓮’k = facial_meaning(k,𝛷,𝓮’k);  // interpret them as facial expressions 
48       𝓰k = in_Gesture(ξ);            // get manual gesture images 
49       𝓰’k = gesture_meaning(k,𝛷,𝓰’k);// interpret them as gestured signs 
50       𝓱k = in_headMovement(ξ);       // get head and shoulders images 
51       𝓱’k = headMov_meaning(k,𝛷,𝓰’k);// interpret them as gestured signs 
52       𝓫k = in_BodyPosture(ξ);        // get body images 
53       𝓫’k = posture_meaning(k,𝛷,𝓫’k);// interpret them as body postures 
54       {𝓿”k,𝓹”k,𝓮”k,𝓰”k,𝓱”k,𝓫”k}=semantics(𝓿’k,𝓹’k,𝓮’k,𝓰’k,𝓱’k,𝓫’k,αk-1,πk-1,𝛷); 
55       αk = adjacent_pair({𝓿”k,𝓹”k,𝓮”k,𝓰”k,𝓱”k,𝓫”k });      //is msg an AP? 
56       πk = pref_dispreference({𝓿”k,𝓹”k,𝓮”k,𝓰”k,𝓱”k,𝓫”k }); //is msg P/D? 
//according to its interpretation, if the agent disagrees   
57       if (𝓿”k==d ˅ 𝓹”k==d ˅ 𝓮”k==d ˅ 𝓰”k==d ˅ 𝓱”k==d ˅ 𝓫”k==d ˅ αk==d ˅ πk==d) 
58         out_negativeFdbk(k,𝛷);       // output a negative feedback (repair) 
59         k = 0;                       // maybe reset Cu(k) index 
//if the recipient agrees with the interpreted signs 
60       else if (𝓿”k==a ˄ 𝓹”k==a ˄ 𝓮”k==a ˄ 𝓰”k==a ˄ 𝓱”k==a ˄ 𝓫”k==a ˄ αk==a ˄ πk==a) 
61         out_positiveFdbk(k,𝛷);       // output a positive feedback 
62         k = k+1;                     // maybe increase Cu(k) index 
//but, the agent may not give any feedback 
63       else 
64         out_neutralFeedback(k,𝛷); 
65         k = K+1;                     // maybe increase Cu(k) index 
//simultaneously, create a plan 𝒫(Ρ), it must be ready at the turn change!  
66       (Ρ)t+1 = planCreator(𝓿”k,𝓹”k,𝓮”k,𝓰”k,𝓱”k,𝓫”k,𝛷); 
//as the receiver interpret any sign indicating turn change  
67       if (𝓿”k==c ˅ 𝓹”k==c ˅ 𝓮”k==c ˅ 𝓰”k==c ˅ 𝓱”k==c ˅ 𝓫”k==c ˅ αk==d ˅ πk==d) 
68         my.turn=1;                   // change the role and play ‘emitter’ 
//end of loop 
 
5.2.3 Explaining the Algorithm 
When engaged in a face-to-face interaction, agents execute the algorithm from line 01 to 68 of this 
pseudocode. The line 02 describes that both agents update the context at the beginning of the 
interaction. This means that externally, they seek information about the scenario and situation they 
are in, they evaluate whether other agents can hear or participate in the interaction, and decide 
which relevant information may help to organize the form and content of the conversation. In 
addition, internal data are retrieved for information concerning the other interactor(s), the 
grounding knowledge they share, culture in which they are immerse, words, phrases, and gestures 
that are appropriate for use in such situation. Thus, 𝛷 (line 02) is a module that perform intense 
information processing. Each agent obtains its own 𝛷 depending on several initial conditions. 
Lines 03 and 39 describe an if-then-else structure that decides the role an agent is playing. If the 
variable my.turn=1, the agent plays the emitter (ξ) and executes lines 04 to 38; otherwise, if 
my.turn=0 the agent plays the recipient (ℜ) and executes the loop from lines 40 to 68. Let us first 
analyze the behavior of an agent playing an emitter. 
 
 
5.2.4 The emitter’s role 
By performing the emitter, an agent must first be aware of the size of the communication plan to be 
carried out, and it is what we described in line 04. From line 05 to 35 the algorithm describes a loop 
that controls the execution of all Cus the agent has in its communication plan. The index k controls 
which Cu(k) is executed at certain time. Then, the agent generates a sequence of outputs. In lines 06, 
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07, 08, 09, and 10 the algorithm shows that agent triggers the modules for verbal output associated 
to prosody, facial expressions, gestures, head movements and body postures respectively. 
The verbal output module may be a simple text on a screen or a complex system that emits 
phonemes associated to intonation and other voice attributes. The facial expression module may be 
a physical face of a robot, the face of a 2D- or 3D-avatar on a screen, or a human face. Likewise, the 
gesture module controls gestures that may be produced by humans, maybe by robot arms or by a 
virtual character on a screen. The same applies to head movements and body postures, whenever 
these are applicable. 
The order of activation of these modules is not fixed. In most of the situations all modalities will 
occur in parallel. It depends not only on the plan being executed, but also on the feedback received, 
as well as the intention of what the agent wants to provoke in the other interactor's mind. 
Simultaneously to what the agent is performing in lines 06 to 10, the agent executes the lines 11 to 
22. The line 11 means that the algorithm receives data from a verbal input module, which can be a 
simple chat editor that receives text, but it can also be a complex voice recognition system with 
syntax analyzer and grammar parser. While on line 11 the algorithm obtains verbal information, in 
line 12 it triggers a module for interpreting data with semantic significance for the verbal signs 
received from the module in line 11. In parallel, in line 13 the algorithm receives data from prosody 
detection module, then it sends these data to an interpreter (line 14), a module that extracts 
meanings on prosody components. Verbal and prosody components usually are interpreted 
together.  
Lines 15, 17, 19, and 21 show that the algorithm is linked to modules for visual information input. In 
line 15 the algorithm triggers a module that extracts facial information, in line 17 it triggers a module 
that captures information from manual gestures, in line 19 it triggers a module that capture head and 
shoulders movements, and in line 21 it triggers a module that captures bodily postures and 
movements. Equally to the previous verbal modules, meaning must be extracted from sequences of 
image signs. The lines 16, 18, 20, and 22 show the respective triggers for each interpreter module. 
Single quotation mark applied to the name of a variable denoting a modal sign, e.g. 𝓿', means that 
these signs are firstly interpreted in a linguistic interpretation module, derived from the raw sign 
perceived by the sensorial system. Then signs are interpreted in semantic meaning modules, whose 
results are represented with double quotation mark, as in 𝓿", which means they are derived from 
signs previously (linguistically) interpreted by earlier modules.  
These modules (lines 15, 17, 19, 21, 16, 18, 20, and 22) must perform a complex set of consecutive 
information processing and intense inter-process communication. For instance, an agent states 
"panda is a cool word. Do you know what it means?". To make sense, the adjacent pair (AP - section 
2.3.1) should be an answer because a question was made. Besides, the other interactor should not 
answer "it is a pronoun”, unless the interactor’s intention is to make the asker to burst into laughter. 
Therefore, agents must keep track and recall verbalizations (and gestures) occurring throughout the 
current interaction. It means that they must connect and contextualize the communication plan they 
are performing with what was said and expressed in previous turns and former Cus. In order to keep 
track of the AP as well as whether preferred or dispreferred responses (PD - section 2.3.2) have 
occurred, the algorithm has two modules: adjacent_pair() and pref_dispreference (). The variable αk 
holds data for AP while πk holds data for PD. αk holds answers for questions such as “was this 
response compatible with the expected APtx?”, “how to fix a deviation from an expected response for 
the APtx?”, etc. Similarly, πk holds answers for questions such as “was the last response a P or a D 
one?”, “is the last response relevant?”, “how to fix deviations from an expected response for the 
PDtx?”, etc. Distinct implementations of the algorithm may require other questions for both AP and 
PD depending on what the designer intends to model.    
In line 23, the algorithm calls a function that integrates the interpreted signs till the kth iteration. This 
integrator compounds verbal, visual signs, AP and PD responses and contextual information to jointly 
obtain a meaning for such components. Three arguments are included in the function: αk-1, πk-1, and 
𝛷. The argument 𝛷 defines the context. Note that the modules adjacent_pair() updates the value of 
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αk (for kth iteration) only in line 24, but its contents αk-1 is used in line 23. The same occurs with 
pref_dispreference () that updates the value of πk in line 25, but its contents πk-1, is also used as 
argument for the meaning integrator. Both modules (lines 24 and 25) update their respective data 
after integrating signs, performed in line 23. 
Let us see un example: to smile and to wave hands may mean a greeting message, such as "hello, I'm 
here". A verbalization such as "humm" associated to a lateral head movement may mean a negation 
in certain cultures, but it may mean something else in other context, like a mockery. A formal 
situation in which a particular adjacent pair is expected, or a situation that some peculiar gesture is 
expected as preferred response can be determinant for the success or a fully failure when engaging 
in face-to-face interactive situations. That is why it is important to have the modules AP (line 24) and 
PD (line 25) always tracking the interaction steps, but it makes sense to update them only after 
interpretating the meaning of the chunk of information currently received. One can only determine if 
an adjacent pair is consistent or if a preferred response occurred after fully interpreting the meaning 
of the Cuk currently received. 
Back to the meaning integrator (line 23), we may say that the result of the signs integration is unique 
for each agent. The database used for integrating meanings may be something like a look-up-table 
(LUT) that the agent updates all the time. Such LUT depends on the experiences the agent had 
passed through its life. In addition, every interpreted element must update such LUTs whenever any 
sign association generates new meanings. In this sense, the function of the signs integration module 
is to query this database and associate the current Cuk with information concerning the interactor, 
stereotyped behaviors, expected AP and PD responses, as well as with data describing the current 
context. 
In lines 26, 29, and 31 the algorithm contains another decision-making structure. After the result 
from integrator module, the agent checks if feedback signs obtained disagree (line 26), agree (line 
29) or are neutral (line 31) concerning some expected feedbacks. The correct understanding about 
how we use these terms will be discussed later (section 6.3). As said, the recipient (ℜ) may realize 
verbal and/or visual feedbacks while the emitter is performing the current Cuk. If ξ interprets 
feedback signs of disagreement in any of the channels, verbal (𝓿”k==d), prosodic (𝓹”k==d), facial 
(𝓮”k==d), gestural (𝓰”k==d), head movements (𝓱”k==d), or postural (𝓫”k==d); then ξ probably 
triggers a routine to repair the situation (line 27). Linguists call this type of repair a self-repair 
(section 2.3.5).  A self-repair can be characterized by correction in phonemes, intonations, facial 
expressions, gestures, as well as correction of words, of a whole utterance, of a sequence of facial 
expressions or gestures. Possibly, in situations that require critical repairs, a self-repair may imply 
changes on the entire communication plan 𝒫𝑡𝑥
𝜉
. A self-repair involves the modification of the Cus; 
hence, the variable that controls the end of the turn may need update, as shown in line 28. In fact, 
agents may decide not to perform a self-repair even receiving feedbacks that show the 
communication is not causing the desired effect. Agents may ignore such signs and proceed with its 
initial communication plan due to many reasons, for instance, ξ may be confident that ℜ will 
understand the message after fully completing the original communication plan.  
On the other hand, if the current plan has generated the expected effect in the ℜ's mind, the 
perceived feedbacks should match with those expected by ξ. In line 29, the algorithm tests if ℜ has 
agreed with all Cus received till the kth iteration. It tests feedback signs of the channels verbal 
(𝓿”k==a), prosodic (𝓹”k==a), facial (𝓮”k==a), gestural (𝓰”k==a), head movements (𝓱”k==a), and 
postural signs (𝓫”k==a). It can be understood as test if ℜ has understood the sequence of Cus till that 
point. If all feedbacks agree to the expected ones, ξ probably just continues the communication plan, 
as shown in line 30.  
The algorithm may also execute lines 31, 32 and 33 when ξ has received neutral feedbacks or no 
feedback at all. In these cases, ξ may decide to emphasize aspects of its communication plan by 
modifying multimodal signals, or it may change sentences, etc. It means to modify the initial 
communication plan in the same way described earlier. However, due to uncountable reasons, ξ may 
also decide to keep the original plan and ignore the recipient's indifference. Modifications may imply 
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changes to the size of the communication plane, thus, in line 33 the algorithm revises the size of the 
plan. 
To complete the explanation of how an agent performs the role of emitter, each time ξ performs a 
Cuk, the algorithm increments the index k. Then, the algorithm tests if k=z; which means to test if the 
communication plan reached the end (lines 34, 35, and 36). If it is the case, the algorithm calls a 
function in which ξ forwards a hint to ℜ showing that it is passing the turn to the other interactor 
(line 37), then ξ changes its own status to recipient (line 38). 
Let us consider that the protocol works normally, then, the agent ℜ, who performs now the 
recipient, will take the turn and will assume the role of emitter, vice versa. However, when it does 
not occur, agent ξ may wait a while and tries to resume the conversation. Such situations may result 
in embarrassments that should be predicted in man-machine interactions. Such situations are not 
described in this algorithm to not extend the article. 
As seen earlier in CA theory, humans seek for transition relevance places (TRP, section 2.3.4) for 
dynamically changing the turns in conversations. This component was not foreseen in the present 
algorithm. First, because it is an improvement in the performance of the model that can be 
implemented later. Second, because it is a subtlety that can be modeled in several ways in the 
algorithm, to the liking of the designer. Third, because this component may be learned to the extent 
that an agent uses the language interactively. In fact, it may be a perpetual learning process for each 
one the agent is interacting with. Thus, TRP is for future implementation for both, the emitter and 
the recipient role. 
 
5.2.5 The recipient’s role 
In the algorithm, the role of recipient (ℜ) is described from line 40 to 68. The perceptive and 
interpretative modules, triggered from lines 42 to 53, have been described previously for lines 11 to 
22. These are the same modules that receive and interpret sounds and visual signs. In line 54, the 
algorithm triggers the meaning integrator module, which also perform similar function to the module 
described for line 23. As in the emitter role, the meaning integrator module uses αk-1, πk-1, and 𝛷 
arguments, and it works in the same way. Similarly, the recipient keeps track on adjacent pairs (line 
55) and evaluates the preferred or dispreferred actions and responses (line 56).  
There are minor operational differences between the receiver and the interpreter modules, as well 
as in the meaning integrator module for the recipient role. Their functions are to receive and 
interpret signs, with differences only in attention and in the information processing given to the 
chain of signs. A distinction can be that the recipient must combine all signs and then to recompose 
each Cu sent by emitter for then to extract meaning; differently of the emitter that, while carrying 
out its communication plan, uses the receptor and interpreter modules focused on detecting 
feedbacks. Moreover, except for some well-defined and obvious adjacent pairs, the recipient has no 
a priori notion of what will be received, as well as it has no notion of the size of the emitter's 
communication plan. The recipient's task is to compose as many signs as possible, to interpret them, 
and then to extract a meaning from the entire message.   
At the line 57, the agent checks if the received signs disagree with expectancies on a basal message 
comprehension. For now, let us consider that the logical test if (𝓿”k==d ˅ 𝓹”k==d ˅ 𝓮”k==d ˅ 𝓰”k==d 
˅ 𝓱”k==d ˅ 𝓫”k==d ˅ αk==d ˅ πk==d) only detects a conformity (or not) with a basal level of 
interpretation. In case ℜ disagrees with some interpreted sign, it may execute line 58 and triggers a 
negative multimodal feedback. It means that agent can perform some negative facial expression, 
gesture, sounds, or compound signs, which the agent may take from a learned LUT, possibly from a 
set of negative cultural signs. ℜ can only expect that these signs would be interpreted by ξ as a 
disagreement. Yet, ℜ may also decide not to emit feedback at all, even disagreeing with what was 
received. 
In our proposal, while receiving sequences of multimodal signs, the agent compares them to the 
contents of a database, which contains stereotyped sequences of signs for commonplace 
conversation. In such lower level, the agent generates feedbacks demonstrating whether the 
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interpreted signs match with sentences, gestures and facial expressions commonly used. If the 
sequence of received signs agrees with what ℜ expects from a well-performed message, the 
algorithm provides positive multimodal feedback. This is described in line 60 by the logical test if 
(𝓿”k==a ˄ 𝓹”k==a ˄ 𝓮”k==a ˄ 𝓰”k==a ˄ 𝓱”k==a ˄ 𝓫”k==a ˄ αk==a ˄ πk==a) and the triggering of 
positive feedback is described in line 61. As said, ℜ may also decide not to emit feedbacks, as well as 
it may decide to generate neutral signs (line 64). 
It is important to notice that, during the period in which ℜ interprets what the emitter 
communicates, it must prepare a communication plan to answer ξ as soon as it receives (or takes) 
the next turn. This is what the concept of adjacent pairs tells us, and it takes milliseconds in humans. 
In other words, while ℜ interprets a multimodal message, it prepares a plan with the contents of 
what will be communicated on the next turn.  
It is necessary to clarify that not always ℜ is able to start elaborating a plan right after interpreting 
the kth Cu. In fact, ℜ must receive enough and relevant information in such a way that the 
conversation comes to a meaning. For instance, let's consider that on the previous turn ℜ, as an 
emitter, had asked: "how old are you?". At the current turn, ξ answers like this: "well, I was born in 
the previous millennium, in 1930! Yes, I am quite old man, I am 88 years old". In this case, ℜ does not 
receive enough information until ξ says 1930 or 88 years. This is what was described as TRP (section 
2.3.4). As said earlier, there may have several ways to implement TRP, because a designer may model 
such detection within the meaning integrator, another designer may implement it as a separate 
module, while another one may implement it within the adjacent pair module, once TRP is related to 
preserving the meaning of a message within an adjacent pair.  
In summary, after receiving enough information, ℜ starts creating a plan to continue the logical 
structures of messages on the adjacent pair. ℜ does that even during the time it is still interpreting 
the message that ξ is emitting. Anticipation is a key point to make direct physical interactions more 
efficient. Our brains anticipate the creation of the next communication plan to improve the dynamics 
of face-to-face communication. For face-to-face interactions to look more natural and efficient, an AI 
agent should have a module that anticipates the creation of communication plans on the fly, 
mimicking the human brains. In line 66, the algorithm triggers a module that describes the plan 
creation for the next turn. 
Finally, line 67 shows a structure if (𝓿”k==c ˅ 𝓹”k==c ˅ 𝓮”k==c ˅ 𝓰”k==c ˅ 𝓱”k==c ˅ 𝓫”k==c ˅ αk==c ˅ 
πk==c) that checks whether the agent ξ has sent any sign indicating a cue for turn change. If ℜ 
interprets any sound or visual sign as an indication that it should resume the conversation, then ℜ 
changes its own status to emitter (line 68) and takes on the execution of the next turn. As we have 
seen in the emitter’s role, when a cue for changing turn does not occur, agent ℜ may wait a while 
and tries to interrupt the emitter, what is called by Linguists as to take the turn (or to take the floor). 
The action of taking turns may also result in embarrassments and may be interpreted as a sign of ℜ’s 
rudeness or as an unpolished attitude. Although it is not described in this algorithm, processes for 
dealing with such situations should be predicted in man-machine interactions. Policies and subtleties 
of turn change can be learned to the extent that agents interact face-to-face. 
  
6. Discussion 
There are four fundamental discussions in this section: why we have used the notion of mental states 
on this algorithm, how to represent and process data represented by tuples on this proposal, how 
the ideas and thoughts are transmitted and interpreted within the framework, as well as how to deal 
with turn taking and disruptions on the normal flow of the algorithm. 
 
6.1 Why mental states. 
A first discussion to be addressed refers to the way we used the Conversation Analysis perspective. 
We honestly will understand any criticism concerning how we associate intentions with this theory. 
CA uses ethnomethodology as the main methodological tool, a methodology that avoids attributing 
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mental states to the participants of the conversation. In fact, mental states are not attributed to the 
participants of the interaction in any way. When analyzing a video or audio of participants of a 
conversation the CA researcher never says that someone was mocking, or hesitant, embarrassed, shy 
or anything like that. In our proposal we are doing something that may receive severe criticism 
because we are associating CA with Theory of Mind. In ToM, agents do something to bring about a 
mental state in the interactor's mind. In ethnomethodology, as observers, we cannot say what the 
participant’s intention was. Only the participant himself could reveal what was his real intention. 
Researcher's intervention can be a source of problems because many humans do things in 
interactions without being aware of what they wanted to cause. Humans may have intentions that 
are hidden to themselves. 
However, members of the AI community and computer programmers know that it is not possible to 
send a complex message without each step of such message (a sequence of signs) being pre-defined. 
Moreover, we intend to aggregate intonation and multimodal components to the message. Any 
message sender has to pre-organize such signs before to start transmitting them. Hence, it seems 
appropriate to make use of known concepts, such as plans and intentions, used in BDI agents, to 
explain how a machine could perform any natural communication with humans. 
A plan is an anticipation of some steps that an agent must carry out pursuing a goal. Anticipatory 
systems are what AI most constructs and deals with. To some degree, acting intelligently means 
anticipating events and deciding which action(s), among the possible options, will be the most 
appropriate in each context. This brings the notion that intelligent agents choose certain responses 
because they have intentions and act aiming certain results.  
In this sense, the agent's goal when communicating is to cause states of comprehension of a message 
in the interpreter system of a recipient. Just to facilitate the writing of this article we have used the 
term mind for such interpreter system. If an agent intends to cause a certain state of understanding 
in a human mind, it is easier for us to use in the text mental states instead of other term. Mental 
state is the main matter of Theory of Mind, thus, if we want to speak natural language with 
machines, it will be natural that machines might be able to understand ironies, sarcasms, jokes, 
metaphors, facial expressions, gestures; besides the union of different multimodal signs for changing 
the overall meaning of what may seems a plain message. It means also that machines ought to know 
how to generate these language resources for human interpretation. Any set of signs planned to 
generate in humans certain mental states can be considered an intentional act. In a fabulous article, 
Nagel questioned "what is it like to be a bat?" (59). It would be the case to ask whether machines 
someday will have the answer for the question "what is it like to be a human?". 
For our algorithm, we think that machines can deal with representations that give them abilities to 
provoke and understand certain human mental states. Therefore, we should consider they may have 
some kind of mind. Besides, they must have a planner capable of transforming the intentional act of 
provoking certain mental states into a human mind into a set of multimodal signs. 
 
6.2 Improving the Methods 
As mentioned earlier, our research method is based on qualitative analysis of videotaped semi-
spontaneous interactions. We carry out micro-level analysis of conversational sequences having as 
foundation the perspective of CA. In spite of the quality and the number of cameras used on video 
capture, and in spite of the better the software tool used to perform the analysis, the identification 
of expressions and gestures is still subjective. When an interactor performs subtle manifestations, 
one analyzer may differ from another concerning certain manifestation of prosody, certain gesture, a 
relevant facial expression which modifies the meaning of a message, and so on. 
In order to eliminate discrepancies in analyzes, a plausible proposal would be the inclusion of 
neuroscience in our method of capturing and analyzing facial interactions. There are today's data 
acquisition systems that unequivocally show whether certain muscle activities really occur. As an 
example, we can mention motion capture systems for body postures, facial expressions and manual 
gestures. We can even make use of electromyograms to capture muscular activity on the faces. 
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Three types of valuable data may emerge from the introduction of neuroscience measurements in 
experiments: firstly, we can be sure of the activation of certain signs during communication; 
secondly, we obtain temporal measures of the occurrence of relevant events, and thirdly, we can 
have quantitative measures of the occurrence of events, which may favor the application of 
statistical tools on the data and thus allow to find correlations between events. 
A possible drawback by using neuroscientific method would be the loss of spontaneity in the 
interaction as we place the apparatus for neurological data capture. We suspect that, even if we do 
not use invasive equipment in the capture of neural signals, we may observe an interference of the 
devices in the spontaneity of the conversation, but it must be confirmed. 
Using automated analysis software should also improve the performance of the analysis. In addition, 
it would still be necessary to perform experiments with standardized method in various cultures to 
prove which components of the algorithm proposed herein are truly universal (if any), and which are 
culturally specific.  
Specifically, for human-machine interactions, we have also to investigate which kind of multimodal 
components may function and which ones may not work well. Several investigations are in course in 
this direction. Maybe certain multimodal components may work well for robots but not for mobile 
phones or for computers. Possibly, we will have to replace the task-oriented assessment method, 
often used in AI, by skill-oriented (60) or cognitive performance methods in order to better evaluate 
the performance of an artificial agent which uses multimodal interaction. 
 
6.3 Resisting or Acquiescing to New Ideas 
Another discussion concerns the use of the terms agreement, disagreement, and neutral in the 
algorithm. When we say that ℜ sends feedback indicating that it agrees with ξ, and vice versa, or 
when we say ξ checks if the signs disagree with some expected feedback, we intend to say that ℜ 
and ξ have informed that correctly interpreted the sequence of signs as a valid message. We do not 
mean that they have acquiesced to an idea issued by the other. Any effort for convincing the 
recipient is beyond the scope of our study. Attempting to convince the recipient of something leads 
an interaction to a level at which the emitter attempts to change the other agent's beliefs, which is 
not the case explained in this algorithm.  
This is a subject that requires knowledge from Discourse Analysis, which is another area of Linguistic 
studies. We may say that a hierarchically superior layer is needed to deal with ideas, discourses and 
persuasion within the present algorithm. It seems to us that the agent must have mechanisms for 
creating a second order plan, not only for checking whether its basal communication plan is correctly 
interpreted but also for checking whether the other agent demonstrates that has captured the main 
idea, has convinced about key arguments, and so on. 
Nevertheless, after implementing such level of information processing, designers must be aware that 
agents send feedbacks about “acquiescence” or “resistance” to arguments and ideas within the same 
algorithm and by the same sign modalities we have described. In other words, because ℜ and ξ may 
not have the same beliefs, their ideas may not match. Resisting or acquiescing to new ideas, 
concepts, and arguments is in other layer of information treatment, but the feedback channels are 
the same and when an agent agree/disagrees with the interactor (indicating it has not understood 
something) it sends the same multimodal feedback signs as when it resists or accept new 
information. An agent may use the same vocalization or facial expression for the whole discourse or 
for a single punctual misread sign. In this sense, it is up to some dedicated engine in the agents to 
interpret whether the feedback indicates accordance (or not) with a single chunk of information (a 
Cu), an utterance, an idea, or with the general discourse. 
 
6.4 Interruptions and Turn Taking 
Normally, after executing all Cus, the agent passes the turn to the other interactor. However, a 
communication plan in execution may be interrupted by other interactor(s) that may overlap or even 
forcibly take the turn before an emitter complete the execution of its turn. We may consider that 
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agents should learn how to deal with specific characteristics of turn taking (taking the floor - section 
2.3.4) for each agents (or groups) in the same way they may learn traces of personalities of each 
interactor. It is known that, in certain cultures, people talk simultaneously, overlapping the 
conversation. In certain cultures, or in hot debates, it is usual the recipient to interrupt and to take 
the floor from a speaker, while in other cultures or in certain contexts it may mean rudeness.  
In other words, one agent should learn and memorize specific details about overlapping and taking 
the floor. Each agent must have some a database with descriptions of each interactor's usual habits 
concerning this aspect; such as: “this agent always waits the end of my turn,” or “this agent 
frequently overlaps me when it is nervous,” or “this agent is rude because it usually takes my turn and 
does not let me finish my utterance,” and so on. Discussions concerning exceptions to the basic 
protocol presented in this text are beyond the scope of this article and can be an interesting subject 
for investigation. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Multimodal face-to-face interactions greatly enrich the exchange of information between two 
agents, mainly because both agents become active, that is, both agents are emitting and interpreting 
signs simultaneously. From the point of view of who is emitting an utterance, the advantage is to 
have more resources, more channels to add signs that add values to the information. From the 
standpoint of who is receiving an utterance, the advantage is to be able to judge relevant 
components that are not in the utterance itself. On the other hand, from the computational point of 
view, multimodal interactions simply mean exponential increase in computational demand, in 
addition to an increase in the complexity of the algorithms at levels still far from being reached. 
Linguists began to scratch the surface of multimodal communication. As pointed out by Vinciarelli 
and colleagues, there are many challenges and much to be done in modeling, analysis and synthesis 
of human behavior, in human-human and human-machine interactions (61). Recent advances in the 
area begin to show how the various modalities interact with each other (see (33), (36), (40), (43), 
(10)). These findings reveal not only how multimodal interactions modify meanings but also what 
kind of computation a mind must perform to maintain the flow of face-to-face interaction. 
With data obtained from our research we could testify that several multimodal signs interact with 
each other when two agents are in direct face-to-face conversation. Based on these data we set up a 
framework that fits to linguistic theories we have based on, such as Conversation Analysis and 
Gesture Studies. Based on such findings we show in this paper an algorithm that elucidate what kind 
of information processing an artificial intelligence system must realize to mimic the human face-to-
face interaction. 
We conclude that it is possible to construct a double-feedback system that accounts for processing 
all types of signs (verbal, prosodic, visual signs, etc.) and extracting meaning from them. This loop can 
maintain the conversation flow and organization of turn-taking, adjacent pairs, preferences, repairs, 
self-repairs, as well as to implement transition relevance place (TRP) for increasing performance on 
direct interactions. Moreover, we conclude it is possible to create such loop aggregating independent 
and cooperative modules, each one dealing with one modality of human communication. Having 
separate modules that recognize syntax, semantic, prosody, facial expressions, bodily expressions, 
etc. independently allow the system to grow by incorporating modalities as desired.  
A challenge is to integrate and keep track of the temporal evolution for each set of signs. Moreover, 
all these multimodal processing might be done in "real time", once humans react to face-to-face 
communication in a timescale of hundreds of milliseconds. Another big challenge is to construct 
higher hierarchical levels for interpreting ideas, concepts and thoughts.  
In our view, a major contribution of this article is to present an overview on how the operational flow 
of multimodal face-to-face interactions happens. The algorithm describes how multimodal signs 
interfere on the interactive conversation, allowing the interactors to change turns, to perform 
repairs, or even changing “on the fly” their intentions of communication. We claim that a double 
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(positive or negative) feedback loop in face-to-face multimodal communication keeps interactions 
within culturally established patterns. 
Lots must be done. Firstly, we deal with data coming from video analysis alone. In this direction, 
neuroscientific measures should validate and reinforce our findings. Secondly, we have analyzed only 
conversation of native Brazilian-Portuguese speakers. Despite this, based on cues from specialized 
literature, we are convinced that the algorithm should work in many (if not all) cultures. Moreover, 
the algorithm seems to work for several man-machine interactive situations, from  chatterbots and 
virtual characters to robots, what makes it especially interesting for AI application. Further 
investigation may reveal what is common and what may be cultural artifacts in face-to-face 
interaction; but we are convinced that the double feedback loop remains valid. What may change are 
nuances of how specific cultures treat certain signs, especially when these signs overlap during the 
conversational flow. 
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Appendix A. Transcription conventions (symbols used on Table 1) 
[  left square brackets indicate a point of overlap onset. 
]  right square brackets indicate a point at which two overlapping utterances both ends, or one 
utterance ends while the other continues, or simultaneous moments in overlaps which continue. 
=  equal signs indicate continuous utterance with no break or pause and/or latch. 
(.)  a brief pause, usually less than 0.2 seconds 
::  colons indicate prolongation of the immediately prior sound. The longer the colon row, the 
longer the prolongation. 
-  a dash indicates a cut-off of the preceding word or sound or an interruption in utterance. 
° a degree symbol indicates whisper or increased volume speech  
? question mark or rising pitch 
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